Economic rationality and ethical behavior by Marc Le Menestrel
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
1, 2
Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
Marc Le Menestrel
Department of Economics and Business
University Pompeu Fabra
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. +34 93 542 27 23
Marc.Lemenestrel@econ.upf.es
                                                
1 Forthcoming in Business Ethics: A European Review.
2 This paper originates from discussion with Henri-Claude de Bettignies and from my work on a model
of rationality that would combine procedural and consequential dimensions. I am also grateful to the
participants of the 11
th International Symposium on Ethics, Business and Society held at IESE Business
School in Barcelona, July 2001.Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
Page 2/13
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
Executive Summary
This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannot be reduced
one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulas like “profit is ethical” or
“ethics pays”. In order to express ethical dilemmas as opposing economic interest
with ethical concerns, we propose a model of rational behavior that combines these
two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner.
Behaviors that are neither ethical nor profitable are considered irrational (non-
arbitrariness). However, behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that
are ethical but not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combining ethical
concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn an optimal form of
rationality between venality and sacrifice.
Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethical business
remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actually sacrificed. We argue
however that ethical business has an interest in demonstrating its consistency between
communication and behavior by a transparent attitude. On the other hand, venal
behaviors must remain confidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency.
This discursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helps to further
distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.
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"He is certainly not a good citizen who does not wish to promote, by every means in
his power, the welfare of the whole society of his fellow-citizens."
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
1  Introduction
In his famous and influential article “The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits” (1970), Milton Friedman reduces ethical behavior to economic
rationality. He argues that companies allegedly promote the common good by solely
pursuing their economic interest: profit is ethical.
Thirty years later, business companies have taken a prominent role in a global society.
In several occasions, such as the accusations against tobacco companies’ behaviors or
the attitudes of oil companies towards environmental and human right issues, the
social role of business has been questioned. Behind the question of whether it is
business that serves society or society that is instrumentalized to serve business, there
is evidence that profit may not be ethical.
In this context, how economic rationality relates to ethical behavior? Just as Friedman
was reducing ethical behavior to economic rationality, a new trend reduces economic
rationality to ethical behavior. Business should acknowledge a social responsibility
because it is economically rational: ethics pays.
A first section of this paper argues that the reduction of economic rationality to ethical
behavior and the reduction of ethical behavior to economic rationality are too
simplistic, inappropriate and misleading. Considering that ethics necessarily follows
from profit, or that profit necessarily follows from ethics avoids the essence of an
ethical dilemma: how to rationally combine profits with ethical concerns?
This irreducibility of interest and ethical concerns is the source of our motivation for
elaborating an integrated model where economic rationality and ethical behavior are
distinguished and combined in a non-arbitrary manner. By recognizing that business
actors can rationally answer ethical dilemmas, either in favor of interest or in favor of
ethics, this paper places the ethical question beyond the one of rational behavior and
emphasizes the responsibility of business actors. The interest is to provide for a
simple, if not simplistic, approach to rationality that allows one to discuss ethical
dilemmas explicitly and without calling one side of it “irrational”.
The last section is dedicated to the potentials and limits of this approach. We discuss
in particular the ambiguity proper to the revelation of ethical concerns. Because it is
less specific as to its treatment of rational behavior, it is difficult to trustfully reveal
ethical behavior for those who succeed in combining ethics with business interest. In
the face of such ambiguity, we must go beyond behavioral approaches and adopt a
more discursive approach, introducing the notions of confidentiality and transparency,
in order to discriminate among unethical and ethical behaviors.Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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2  Necessity Avoids Dilemmas
A first approach to the reduction of ethical behavior to economic rationality is to
consider that being economically rational necessarily implies behaving ethically:
profit is ethical.  In turn, by applying a simple modus tollens argument such a
statement amounts to consider  that unethical behavior never pays. With such a
reduction, not only it is useless to care about ethical concerns since they are
automatically satisfied, but there can be no incentives to be unethical since unethical
business cannot be profitable. If this were true, it would not be possible that tobacco
companies behaved unethically because they have been very profitable. Similarly, it
could not be unethical to target children and minorities in tobacco advertising
campaigns, to subvert international authorities or to distort scientific research since
these behaviors allowed considerable profits to be made (these strategies are
documented and analyzed in Zeltner & Al. 2000). If they had been unethical, then
they would have been costly and because they were not, they were not unethical.
If pushed to its logical conclusions, the reduction of ethical behavior to economic
rationality denies the existence of situations where economic interest and ethical
concerns are conflicting. Evidently, acknowledging ethical dilemmas requires
considering that it may be profitable to behave unethically. Such a consideration can
however not be of any necessity in the sense that  unethical behavior would be
necessarily profitable. Indeed, if unethical behavior is a sufficient condition for
economic rationality, then economically irrational behavior is necessarily ethical.
For a business actor, it would suffice to spend money for being ethical while of
course, there are many ways to be both economically irrational and unethical. A costly
behavior may be unethical and must be distinguished from one that is ethical. Should
we maintain the possibility of acting both unethically and unprofitably, one couldn’t
consider that forgiving profits is a guarantee of being ethical.
It is striking how reductionist arguments appear to deny the peculiarity of the relation
between economic interest and ethical concerns. Another typical reduction consists in
considering that only behaviors that are costly are truly ethical. In other words, ethical
behavior would be necessarily costly. But then,  economically rational behavior
would be necessarily unethical. This indeed would contradict the statement that profit
is ethical. If a behavior is profitable, then it is ethical. But if it is ethical then it is
costly and if it is costly, then it is not profitable. Within this reductionist approach,
there is a contradiction in arguing at the same time that profit is ethical and that
ethical behavior must be costly (see Friedman 1971: 219 for such a self-contradicting
example). Considering that ethical behavior is necessarily costly also deprives
business of any incentive for being ethical. For example, if it is ethical to refrain from
polluting the environment, then it is not possible to make profits by implementing an
efficient program of emission reductions or by re-orienting activities towards forms of
energy production that pollute less than oil. But the management of environmental
and social issues is not purely a cost. There can be important long-term strategic
benefits to a proactive approach to these issues (for an example, see Moser, 2001).
Business can invest in ethics in an attempt to combine it with economic interest: there
is no necessary contradiction between ethics and profits.
One may push further such reasoning and consider that ethics pays. In that case, it is
economic rationality that is then reduced to ethical behavior. Like considering that
profit is necessarily ethical, such a reduction may seem attractive at first glance. It
provides a simple argument to motivate business: ethics become instrumental, beingEthical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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reduced to a means towards economic rationality, like one positive attribute that
business should now consider within its role. But we should be aware that such a
reduction couldn’t be of necessity. If ethics necessarily pays, then costly behavior is
necessarily unethical. There is no place for sacrifice in this approach. There is no
dilemma between a willingness to do the good and an interest in not doing so. For
example, if business wants to be ethical, it should never pay for it by choosing a
costly behavior, because such a behavior would be necessarily unethical. By reducing
economic rationality to ethical behavior, we provide for a reasoning according to
which no economic sacrifice may be ethical and thus justified. Once again, the very
tension of an ethical dilemma is ignored.
From profit is ethical to ethics is profitable, the four implications we have studied may
be summarized in the Table 1, contrasted by their equivalent but unreasonable
counterpart.
Table 1: Unreasonable Reductions
POSSIBLE REDUCTION EQUIVALENT STATEMENT
Profit is necessarily ethical Unethical behavior never pays
Ethics is necessarily costly Profit is always unethical
Unethical behavior is necessarily profitable Costly behavior is always ethical
Ethics is necessarily profitable Costly behavior is always unethical
Although it is tempting to avoid ethical dilemmas by stating that profit is necessarily
ethical, to justify a course in ethics by stating that unethical behavior is necessarily
costly or to motivate ethical behavior by stating that ethics pays, these arguments
should be considered with care. If pushed to their structural validity, they become
unreasonable and fail to capture the dilemmas between economic rationality and
ethical behavior.
Business does face situations in which no behavior is both economically rational and
ethical. In these situations, it is certainly not sufficient to consider that making profit
is necessarily ethical or that being ethical will be necessarily profitable. The
responsibility of such a choice rests within the subject who carries it, not in an
abstract form of reasoning that would lead to a definitive and a priori true answer. In
the words of  Kaler (1999: 209), such approaches are  too specific. Rather than
reducing one to the other, business interest and ethical concerns should first be
considered irreducible in order to approach their combination rationally. In this
manner, the acknowledgment of the irreducibility of economic interest and ethical
concerns is a first step towards a methodological approach to ethical dilemmas.
3  Rational Ethical Dilemmas
If an economically rational behavior is not necessarily ethical and if an ethical
behavior is not necessarily economically rational, then there are unethical behaviors
that are economically rational and there are ethical behavior that are not economicallyEthical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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rational. Because such behaviors embody an irreducible tension between ethical
concerns and economic interest, they reflect ethical dilemmas. An ethical dilemma
occurs when one has to choose a behavior where economic interest and ethical
concerns conflict.
There are thus two types of behaviors in the face of ethical dilemmas: one where
economic interest is sacrificed to the respect of ethical concerns, the other where
ethical concerns are ignored so that economic interests are maximized. Which one of
them is rational?
It has been a constant trend of economic methodology to argue that there is one and
only one form of rationality: economic rationality. In this perspective, the sacrifice of
economic interest for the sake of ethical concerns is irrational. A typical example of
such an approach in the case of environmental issues is the position taken by
Velasquez (1992) when he explains why it is “irrational” for a multinational company
to choose to refrain from polluting the environment.
Because such a perspective denies any rationality to immaterial concerns, it is often
qualified as pragmatic. A pragmatic approach to rationality ignores ethical dilemmas
by not considering the possibility of a rational sacrifice. One should do what he
desires. Such an approach is justified by a consequential reasoning, tightly related to
the utilitarian doctrine. In the words of one of its founder: “Of two pleasures, if there
be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided
preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure” (J.S. Mill 1991: 139).
It is not our goal to discuss philosophical doctrines but to push to the extreme the
reduction they underlie so as to justify an integrated approach. In such consequential
approach, any rational behavior is guided by some expectations of consequences.
These consequences differ by their interest and rational behavior is the choice of the
behavior that leads to the best consequence. In this manner, rational behavior is
reduced to the pursuit of interest and behaviors that are not motivated by interest are
irrational. In theory, what is of interest is left undefined, so we can always find an
informal argument that reduces any type of motivation to some interest newly defined.
In practice, and Friedman at least was explicit about it, interest is actually reduced to
money, which becomes the common measure of all economic rational behaviors.
Once again, the irreducible tension between economic interest and ethics is hidden.
An idealist perspective classically contrasts the pragmatic one. It considers that ethical
concerns should never be compromised to the pursuit of interest. What is rational to
do is what is right to do, and there is no right to be unethical. Unethical behaviors that
are economically rational are thus irrational while sacrificing economic interest for an
ethical concern is necessarily the rational behavior. This perspective is best
exemplified by Kant’s doctrine of pure ethics. In his words, there is no right to lie, in
practice and in theory (e.g. Kant 1993)
3.
Such an approach hasn’t been empirically supported by the economic development of
the 20e century. Remember the declaration of Tobacco industry top executives
                                                
3 Neither Kant nor Mill approaches towards ethical dilemmas should be reduced to such over-
simplified statements. Indeed, we believe such reductions reflect more the interest of the commentators
than the writings of their authors (see e.g. Louden 2000 for a very innovative to Kant’s doctrine). This
is also the sense of our quote from Adam Smith at the beginning of the paper.Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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affirming in front of the U.S. Congress that tobacco is not addictive. There may be no
rational right to lie but some individuals and some businesses do rationally engage in
unethical behavior. Each occurrence of an unethical behavior rationally chosen for the
pursuit of interest is an empirical invalidation of the reduction of rationality to ethical
behavior. By denying rationality to unethical behavior, the idealist perspective departs
from empirical observation of actual phenomena. The argument that unethical
behavior is irrational, built on the preeminence of ethics over interest has thus failed
to convince in practice.
If neither the pragmatic nor the idealist perspectives provide us with a convincing
answer to the question of rational behavior in the face of ethical dilemmas, we may
try to combine both in a third way. More precisely, we may suppose that it can be
rational to choose a profitable but unethical behavior as well as to choose a costly but
ethical behavior. Rationality does not appear as a criterion to solve ethical dilemmas
and whether a particular business sacrifices its interest or violates its ethical principles
depends on its moral values and the interests at stake, not on whether it is rational or
not. This reflects that the freedom of choice in the presence of ethical dilemmas is
beyond rationality, neither idealism not pragmatic being able to determine it alone. It
reflects a focus on the specific tension between the two types of approaches while in
pragmatic and idealist approaches, such a tension is reduced to one dimension. Such a
stance is beautifully exemplified by this teaching of Vivekananda (1988: 276):
“Materialism says, the voice of freedom is a delusion. Idealism says, the voice that
tells of bondage is delusion. Vedanta says, you are free and not free at the same time;
never free on the earthly plane, but ever free on the spiritual.”
One integrated approach to combine explicitly material and ethical concerns considers
that any behavior is composed of a process and a consequence. Evaluation of behavior
in terms of the consequences for the actor corresponds to the pragmatic approach. To
each consequence is assigned a quantity that represents its desirability. Besides,
appreciation of behavior in terms of processes, as means to reach consequences,
corresponds to the idealist approach. Means are appreciated qualitatively depending
on whether they respect or violate ethical principles. Depending on whether one wants
to look at consequences only, at processes only, or at the combination of both, one can
approach rationality in a pragmatic manner, in an idealist manner, or in an integrated
manner. In the last case, the ends do not necessarily justify the means but the means
does not justify the ends either
4.
Naturally, in such an integrated approach, there exists a type of behavior that
combines ethics and interest. We call optimal a rational behavior that is both ethical
                                                
4 This duality of rational behavior is present in many forms in the literature. It has however been
overshadowed by the development of quantitative approaches to rationality where mathematical models
reduce everything to one single type of elementary concerns (see e.g. Weber 1978: 24-26, Simon 1978,
Frank 1988). It is puzzling to realize that researchers are reluctant to consider mathematical models
distinguishing explicitly processes from consequences. Sen (e.g. 1987: 74), for instance, argues for a
consequential approach where consequences are “comprehensively” defined, i.e. including procedural
considerations. Le Menestrel (1999) supposes there exist specific preferences for the process by which
consequences are reached and considers the case where process preferences “do not matter” as a limit
case.Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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and economically rational. By combining the two types of motivations, interest and
ethical concerns, optimal behavior is “harmonious”. When possible, we consider it
irrational not to choose the right means to attain the best end. In other words, an
optimal behavior is always rational. Conversely, a rational behavior is not necessarily



















































Figure 1: Ethical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
We thus consider that behaviors that sacrifice economic interest for ethical concerns
or violate ethical principles for the pursuit of interest are rational. Irrational behaviors
are restricted to behaviors that are both unethical and economically irrational. In
Figure 1, we call venal and sacrificial the two types of behavior in the face of ethical
dilemmas.  so as to emphasize their lack of optimality with regards to ethical concerns
and economic interests. Ethical business, when economic interest meets with ethical
concerns, lies between venality and sacrifice.
Building on the irreducibility of ethical concerns and economic interest, we have
proposed an approach to rationality that combines these two types of motivations
without giving priority to one or the other. It treats as rational some behaviors that
would be irrational in a reductionist approach to rationality, either idealist or
pragmatic. In the next section, we show how this helps to better understand the
distinctions among different rational behaviors.
4  The Ambiguity of Ethical Business
If a venal behavior, a sacrificial behavior, and an optimal behavior may all be rational,
how is it possible to distinguish among these forms of rationality by observing the
behavior of actors? If, in particular, we suppose that the behavior of a business actor is
rational, can we infer whether such a behavior is ethical or unethical?
Answering such questions depends on what we may be able to observe and measure
about behavior. In this respect, judgments of ethical nature differ from judgments
about economic interest. As we said, there are indeed two different types of
judgements involved in the characterization of our integrated approach to rationalEthical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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behavior. There are judgements on the consequences, which refer to the maximization
of a quantity (e.g. money), and judgements on the process, which refer to some
qualitative criteria (e.g. ethical principles). Business actors treat economic interest in
an objective and explicit manner and the profitability of a business, at least a
posteriori, aims at constituting an objective quantitative measure. This leads us to
consider that we are able to observe whether a behavior is profitable or not. However,
the measure of ethical concerns is bound to remain dependent upon the ethical
principles called for justifying a particular behavior. We thus do not assume that we
can observe directly whether a behavior is ethical or not.
Suppose first that one observes a behavior that is not profitable. If the behavior is
considered rational, then it implies it is also ethical. This is simply because if it was
unethical, then it would be irrational. In this manner, engaging in non-profitable
behavior reveals that the company as acted according to some ethical concerns. In this
manner, sacrificial behaviors can be distinguished by assuming rational behavior.
Suppose now that we observe a profitable behavior. Then, we cannot infer whether
this behavior is ethical or not by simply supposing this behavior is rational. A rational
and profitable behavior may be ethical or unethical depending on the ethical values of
the actor and the interests at stake. A business actor may engage in unethical behavior
because no optimal behavior is available and because he places its economic interest
before its ethical concerns. In this sense, it is not sufficient to assume the rationality of
the actor to reveal ethical concerns when one observes a profitable behavior. Since
assuming rationality is sufficient to reveal ethical concerns when one observes a
behavior that is not profitable, this approach to rationality is informative in the
absence of profitability but remains ambiguous in the presence of profitability. If it is
not necessary to be economically irrational to be ethical, it is however necessary to be
so in order to let others know you are ethical.
This may be helpful to understand, for example, the conflict between environmentalist
activists and some successful oil companies who, possibly, make real efforts to
integrate ethical concerns in their behavior. Because oil companies are all very
profitable, it is not possible to infer whether they are really ethical or not. This
ambiguity creates a difficulty for ethical business to distinguish itself from venal
business in a credible manner.
It is the behavioral character of our approach to rationality that does not allow us to
discriminate between venal and optimal behavior. If one wants to capture ethical
concerns in these cases, one also must consider the level of intentions, even though
these intentions may not necessarily have behavioral consequences. Beyond behavior
itself, intentions may be revealed through the argumentation and justifications of
rational behavior. Such an approach assumes that attitudes towards communication
differ depending on whether one has the intention to act ethically or not (Habermas
1992).
Consider a rational business actor who engages in a venal behavior. His rational
choice for such a behavior is justified by its consideration of economic interest before
ethical concerns. But it is very difficult to avow such justification through a socially
acceptable argumentation. Imagine a Tobacco company stating that, they do all what
is in their power to make more profit, never compromising such profit for ethical
considerations. Such a cynical attitude, if possible in the facts, would still not be
accepted as a socially legitimate discourse. Similarly, some oil companies fiercely
opposing mandatory restrictions on their CO2 emissions in the fear of decreasing theirEthical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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profits do not say bluntly that they act as such just to make more profits. Business
actors engaging in venal behaviors are thus inclined to adopt an argumentation where
their behavior appears more ethical than it is. In this sense, their communication may
not be consistent with the actual ethical character of their behavior.
On the other hand, a rational business actor who engages in an ethical behavior, either
optimal or sacrificial, has no reasons not to justify its behavior by its ethical
considerations. Moreover, rendering these justifications more prominent may
constitute a social advantage that can increase the economic interest of the ethical
behavior. Consider for instance a tobacco company that intends to engage in
combating advertising to children. If such a behavior implies a loss in terms of
profitability, it will tend to alleviate such a loss by using their ethical commitment as
an additional means to economic profitability by distinguishing itself from
competitors. Similarly, consider an oil company that intends to engage in constraining
its fossil emissions. Even if this behavior is optimal and thus could also be justified in
terms of economic interest, there is no reason not to also capitalize on the ethical
dimension of this behavior by communicating upon it. Business actors engaging in
sacrificial and optimal behaviors are inclined to adopt an argumentation that
highlights the ethical character of their behavior. In this case, their communication
tends to be consistent with the actual ethical character of their behavior.
As we can see, the consistency between communication and behavior appears as a
criterion to distinguish between venal and optimal behavior, between what one says
and what one does. When a behavior is profitable but unethical, such consistency
raises difficulties because a cynical argumentation lacks social legitimacy. Business
actors may thus not say what they really do. When a behavior is profitable and ethical,
such consistency becomes a means towards social legitimacy and additional economic
consequences. In this case, business actors may rather say what they really do, even
though they may not do it for the justifications they give.
These attitudes towards communication imply distinctive managerial approaches of
the relation with society. In the case of venal behaviors, there is a need to protect
one’s business interests by ensuring the confidentiality of the unethical dimensions of
behavior. In the case of ethical business or sacrificial behavior, there is an interest in
ensuring the transparency of the ethical dimensions of behavior. The former would
correspond to a competitive attitude towards society while the latter would correspond
to a cooperative attitude towards society. To the extent these managerial attitudes are
themselves observable, they provide for an indirect revelation of the ethical nature of
the underlying behaviors. Business actors engaging in venal behavior will tend to
adopt competitive attitudes relayed by a strict confidentiality of their actual behaviors,
in order to hide that these behaviors are not consistent with their communication.
Business actors engaging in ethical behavior, sacrificial or optimal, will tend to adopt
cooperative attitudes relayed by an increasing transparency of their actual behaviors,
in order to demonstrate that these behavior are consistent with their communication



















































Figure 2 : Confidentiality and Transparency Towards Society
As an example, one may distinguish between the attitudes of different oil companies.
All companies are very profitable at the moment and the ambiguity is whether some
adopt more ethical behaviors than others. For instance, the confidentiality that has
surrounded one of their most important lobbying force: the Global Climate Coalition,
is an indication in itself of the desire to render difficult the establishment of a
correspondence between behavior and communication. Typically, the list of members
of such groups is not publicly available. That Exxon was a leading business actor
behind it has remained more or less hidden to the general public. In light of our
approach, these render suspect their behavior and provide for an indication, if not a
proof, that they are indeed ignoring ethical concerns so as to maximize their economic
interest. In turn, the now systematic attendance of some other oil companies in open
forums about climate change, their increasing call for participatory approaches, and
their reference to an ideal of unanimity are indications that they are ready to
acknowledge ethical concerns and intend to act ethically. Those companies will thus
have to take their distance from lobbying groups that act confidentially. As BP
Amoco, Shell and others have done, they indeed do so with strong and widespread
communication on their ethical stance (a detailed and documented analysis of the case
of oil industry and climate change can be found in van den Hove & Al. 2001). As we
said, it is only when they will sacrifice some economic interest for their ethical
concerns that they can ascertain their good faith. In the absence of such economic
sacrifices, we can only hope that communicating about their ethical stance and
engaging in more transparent attitudes reinforces the likelihood of unethical behaviors
to be reported and thus reinforces their propensity to do what they say.
To summarize, we have shown that a behavioral approach to rationality that combines
ethical concerns and economic interest allows ethical concerns to be publicly revealed
in case of sacrificial behavior but remains ambiguous as whether a profitable behavior
is ethical or not. We have thus proposed to consider acts of communication in order to
reveal ethical concerns. We proposed that venal behaviors might be indirectly
revealed by competitive attitude towards society based on confidentiality of the
behaviors. The idea is to prevent the society from knowing how profitableEthical Business between Venality and Sacrifice
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consequences are attained. Optimal behaviors might in turn be revealed by
cooperative attitudes towards society based on transparency. The objective is to allow
society to observe how profitable consequences are attained.
5  Conclusion
In this paper, we start by considering that a better rational integration of economic and
ethical dimensions could be helpful to better understand social behavior of business
actors. We think that such integration is difficult to realize because reductionist
approaches are too simplistic to capture the type of combination and of trade-off
between economic rationality and ethical behavior. The considerations that ethics is
necessarily costly, that profit is necessarily ethical, that a lack of ethics pays, or that
ethics necessarily pays fail to capture common sense as well as observation of the
business world.
We propose to acknowledge the irreducibility of these two types of considerations so
as to distinguish different types of rationality, beyond idealist and pragmatic
approaches. We have referred to optimal behavior to characterize a profitable and
ethical behavior, to venal behavior for one that is profitable but unethical, and to
sacrificial behavior for one that is ethical but not profitable. Not all behaviors are
nevertheless rational since a behavior that is unethical and not profitable is considered
irrational. Such approach introduces a form of relativism in rationality because the
choice between a venal and a sacrificial behavior is not rationally determined but
relative to the values of the actors and the interest at stake. We have argued that such
an integrated approach is however not arbitrary since it helps to reveal unethical
behavior when a rational actor chooses an ethical but not profitable behavior. We also
insisted on a remaining ambiguity to discriminate between profitable behaviors.
In our view, these limitations are due to our behavioral approach to rationality and we
have thus attempted to introduce an analysis of communication to enhance our
understanding of ethical dilemmas. Because every one prefers to communicate that he
acts ethically, ethical profitable behavior can be distinguished from profitable
unethical behaviors by the transparent and confidential attitudes they respectively
imply. In this manner, we complemented a behavioral approach with a discursive one.
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